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ABSTRACT
Using data on 52 countries’ banking systems from 2005 to 2014,
we explore how the legal and institutional environment influen-
ces banking system performance. Using panel data and control-
ling for financial and economic development indicators, we find
evidence of several relationships related to banking system per-
formance. First, a higher degree of legal protection for both lend-
ers and borrowers positively affects banking system performance.
Second, there is a positive relationship between the degree of
law enforcement and banking system performance. Third, better
regulatory quality positively affects banking system performance.
Fourth, neither the degree of information sharing nor the control
of corruption has a significant effect on banking sector perform-
ance. Finally, we find no significant differences in banking sector
performance by type of economy.
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1. Introduction
As a result of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, inter-
national organisations such as the Basel Committee, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund have promoted reform programmes encompassing
revised regulatory frameworks. Doing Business provides enlightening data on the
reforms implemented between 2005 and 2018.1 The 186 economies covered by Doing
Business implemented 462 reforms in areas related to obtaining credit (i.e., the degree
of legal protection and information sharing),2 265 reforms related to the degree of
law enforcement and/or contracts, 221 reforms designed to improve dealing with
insolvency, and 213 reforms aimed at strengthening the legal protection of minority
investors. However, there is little consensus regarding how specific regulations as well
as legal and institutional aspects might influence bank performance.3
Based on the consequences of the recent financial turmoil, we hypothesise that any
negative impact on banking system performance may be moderated by institutional
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factors. Thus, a clear legal framework, an efficient judicial system, a solid macroeco-
nomic equilibrium and adequate supervision can attenuate the effect of channels of
contagion in financial crisis events (Anginer, Cerutti, & Peria, 2017; Dungey &
Gajurel, 2015). They can also improve investor confidence about information quality
in capital markets (Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2002) and increase value creation
in several investment opportunities and dimensions (Aragon-Mendoza, del Val, &
Roig-Dobon, 2016; Barba-Sanchez & Atienza-Sahuquillo, 2017; Durnev & Kim, 2005;
Ribeiro Soriano, Roig Dobon, & Tansky, 2010) . In light of this, the effect of eco-
nomic fluctuations on financial systems depends to a great extent on the structural
characteristics of each economy. Aspects such as the size of the capital market, the
concentration of the banking industry as well as the legal and institutional system
shed light on the differences observed in different countries (Anginer, Demirguc-
Kunt, Huizinga, & Ma, 2018; De la Torre, Ize, & Schmukler, 2012).
Using a sample of 52 countries for the period 2005–2014, our results show that a
greater degree of legal protection and law enforcement are directly related to superior
banking sector performance. However, our results suggest a substitution pattern
between these variables. As regards the institutional framework, better regulatory
quality positively affects banking industry performance. Additionally, our results
show that a greater degree of information sharing and better control of corruption
does not influence banking industry performance.
Our work contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we examine what role
legal protection, law enforcement and information sharing play in banking industry
performance as a whole. Second, the indicators used for the legal and institutional
environment are taken from sources such as Doing Business and World Governance
Indicators, which differ in several aspects from the measurements employed in previ-
ous studies.4 Third, besides using a more recent sample, our industry-wide approach
complements previous banking performance studies carried out at the individual
bank level and provides new evidence regarding the macro and industry determinants
of banking system performance. Specifically, we contribute to the literature by point-
ing out the outstanding and unique role of legal protection, law enforcement and
their impact on banking system performance. Previous studies exploring the impact
of legal environment mainly focus on bank-specific aspects (Ben Naceur & Omran,
2011; Demirg€uc¸-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2004; Demirg€uc¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999;
Perera, Skully, & Chaudhry, 2013), whereas we use a wider dataset, which enriches
the discussion concerning how regulatory quality and enforcement provide confi-
dence to savers and investors and improve corporate governance practices in the
banking industry (Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2008).
In addition, our paper has certain implications for policymakers and market par-
ticipants alike, and which relate to understanding the ramifications of the legal and
institutional frameworks as well as other macroeconomic and industry features linked
to banking system performance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
review and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the method-
ology. Section 4 reports and discusses the results. In the last section, we conclude
the study.
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2. Literature review and hypotheses
We analyse the relationship between institutional features and banking system per-
formance from a law and finance perspective, and provide new evidence about bank-
ing sector performance drivers. In an effort to put our study and main hypotheses
into perspective, we review earlier studies in these two areas which lay the founda-
tions for our paper.
2.1. Legal environment
The literature suggests that the soundness of legal environments may matter for
banking performance. Besides the strength of legal rights, we consider the rule of law
to be equally important as part of an efficient legal system.
The differences between the legal protections offered to investors and to creditors
are important in understanding why company financing structures differ across coun-
tries. Law and finance literature has evidenced the importance of the link between
the legal system, investor protection and capital market development (Djankov,
McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, 1999;
Levine, 1998, 1999), and shows a positive influence where the main role of a stronger
legal framework is to empower borrowers when fulfilling their contracts. This reduces
the cost of external financing, the main mechanism through which an adequate legal
framework favours financial development.
Creditors’ legal rights are more complex than those of investors. First, there may be
multiple creditors with different interests, such that protecting the rights of certain
creditors might harm the rights of others. Second, two mechanisms can be imple-
mented when borrowers face a company’s bankruptcy: company liquidation and
reorganisation. Clearly, effective legal enforcement is required to implement these
rights. Along these lines, La Porta et al. (1998) construct an index of creditor legal pro-
tection, which is the most widely used in law and finance literature to measure cred-
itors’ guarantees in the event of company bankruptcy. A higher value of the index
reflects greater creditor legal protection. In addition, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2006) examine the effects of law enforcement on stock market development in
49 countries, devising a set of useful measures to gauge the effective legal rights of
minority shareholders, which is commonly used as a proxy variable for the strength of
legal frameworks. Djankov et al. (2007) extend the dataset of creditors’ legal protection
by including annual data from 129 countries over the period 1978–2003.
Based on the measures of creditors’ legal protection proposed by La Porta et al. (1998),
Levine (1998) argues that a stronger legal system is positively related to private credit over
GDP ratio. Using a sample of 129 countries between 1978 and 2003, Djankov et al. (2007)
provide evidence of a positive relationship between private credit over GDP and creditors’
legal rights, and the degree of information sharing. They also find that the effect of a
strong legal system is more important in countries with higher levels of income.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), however, argue that rules and regulations which
increase control over transactions between private individuals (borrowers and lenders)
have no effect on private credit over GDP. In contrast, Acharya, Amihud, and Litov
(2011) and Vig (2013), show a negative relationship between legal protection for
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creditors and the level of corporate debt, which contradicts the arguments related to
the positive effect of investor protection on the volume of bank credit.
Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010) analyse how exogenous shocks, such as regula-
tory changes in creditor law, affect the credit offering from banks. Their results show
a positive influence of regulatory changes on credit offering, but indicate that when
changes in the law are related to collaterals this positive effect is stronger.
In contrast to most papers that employ the La Porta et al. (1998) Index, updated
by Djankov et al. (2007), our measure to capture the strength of legal rights is an
index that reflects the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the
rights of both borrowers and lenders. In the case of borrowers’ legal rights, a reduc-
tion can be seen in information asymmetry and moral hazard which will benefit
banking system performance (Marthur & Marcelin, 2015). Corporate borrowers
would be more reluctant to engage in risk-taking activities (Acharya et al., 2011) and
in increasing their leverage (Vig, 2013) when creditor rights are strong. In turn, this
could have a positive effect on banking system performance because of lower loan
default levels. However, these potential beneficial effects assume a fixed set of bor-
rowers. The literature suggests that stronger creditor rights increase bank lending
(Djankov et al., 2007). If this increase in lending facilitates access to credit to a wider
set of borrowers who are less creditworthy, bank performance might suffer if higher
loan default rates exceed collateral recovery rates (Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010).
Therefore, and to the best of our knowledge, the influence of the strength of both
borrowers and lenders’ legal rights on banking system performance has not been
explored at length in the literature. This leads us to develop and test the follow-
ing hypotheses:
H1a: A greater degree of legal protection for borrowers and lenders positively influences
banking system performance.
H1b: A greater degree of legal protection for borrowers and lenders negatively
influences banking system performance.
The literature has also highlighted the importance of the quality of legal systems
(usually measured by legal enforcement). In this sense, some studies examine the rela-
tive importance between creditors’ rights and the degree of enforcement on the vol-
ume of credit provided by the banking sector. For instance, Qian and Strahan (2007)
argue that it is creditors’ rights and not the degree of legal enforcement that would
explain the volume of bank credit. Bae and Goyal (2009) suggest that legal enforce-
ment, and not the mere existence of a set of laws, is the key aspect affecting the vol-
ume of bank credit.
Demirg€uc¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) analyse a sample of 80 developed and devel-
oping countries and find that better enforcement of contracts and the legal system
are related to less corruption, which is negatively associated with banking system per-
formance. Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. (2004) explore the influence of institutions, bank
regulation and market structure on bank-level net interest margins and overhead
costs for an international sample of 1,400 banks. They find that tighter regulations
which curb banking institution freedom to conduct their business (restrictions on
bank entry and activities) can help to improve banking system performance. They
also find that bank regulations are rendered insignificant when controlling for
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institutional development indicators, and consequently argue that bank regulations
cannot be analysed in isolation from the institutional framework.
However, other studies such as Leaven and Majnoni (2005) find opposite evi-
dence. Their results suggest that better contract enforcement and a better judicial
system play a key role in improving the net interest margins by reducing the cost of
financial intermediation. Ben Naceur and Omran (2011) provide similar evidence
by suggesting that the regulatory and institutional framework seem to have a
positive influence on bank performance. Said authors find that corruption increases
costs of intermediation whilst an improvement in law enforcement reduces financ-
ing costs. Nevertheless, few studies have actually addressed the possible effect of law
enforcement on banking performance. This leads us to develop and test the follow-
ing hypotheses:
H2a: A greater degree of law enforcement positively influences banking system
performance.
H2b: A greater degree of law enforcement negatively influences banking system
performance.
2.2. Institutional environment
We focus on the following institutional features: the degree of information sharing,
regulatory quality, and the control of corruption. From a theoretical point of view,
the degree of information sharing plays a fundamental role in reducing adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard and in disciplining borrowers. To help with this, information shar-
ing offices have been set up by countries, and include: public credit registries and
private credit bureaus.5
As regards adverse selection, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) develop a credit market
model that analyses what role information sharing plays in lessening adverse selec-
tion. In this model, each bank holds private information about the credit quality of a
certain group of borrowers. If banks were to share such information, informational
asymmetries would be eliminated, thus allowing banks to improve the pool of
selected borrowers, reduce default rates and increase the volume of credit provided
by the banking sector. As a result, the model predicts that by reducing the earnings
derived from private information, competition is increased in the credit market, thus
generating an increase in the volume of credit provided by the banking industry as a
whole. However, and in relation to this last point, the effect on the volume of lending
is uncertain (Martin & Javalgi, 2018). On the one hand, the volume of credit pro-
vided by the banking sector may increase for one group of borrowers whose credit
risk is low, yet on the other hand it may decrease for those with a higher credit risk,
thus rendering the net effect uncertain.
From a moral hazard perspective, Padilla and Pagano (1997) develop a two-period
model assuming imperfect competition and heterogeneity of borrowers in the
banking industry, where the performance of each loan depends on the intrinsic char-
acteristics of each borrower. Additionally, the model assumes that banks are able to
establish long term relationships with specific borrowers, which allows them to main-
tain private information about them. In the initial period, and as a consequence of
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this privileged position, banks can obtain informational rents by raising the interest
rates charged to their clients. This increased rate of interest reduces borrower incen-
tive to perform well for fear that the return from their efforts will be partially appro-
priated by the bank through higher interest rates charged in the future. In this way,
borrowers tend to make little effort and act poorly in the initial period of the model.
On the other hand, Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) find that information sharing
improves the availability of credit at lower rates for firms.
Increased competition in the banking industry resulting from greater information
sharing reduces bank profits in the second period, but not in the first when the banks
still have private information (Alvarez & Jara, 2016). Consequently, a greater degree
of information sharing reduces the market power of the banks and informational
earnings, thus curbing interest rates, moral risk and default rates while increasing the
volume of credit provided by the banking sector.
One final benefit derived from a greater degree of information sharing is that,
because of the existence of a historical register of borrowers’ financial behaviour that
is accessible to the banking system as a whole, borrowers tend to fulfil payment of
their financial commitments. Padilla and Pagano (2000) show that this imposes
greater discipline on borrowers since being known as a defaulter would entail punish-
ment from institutions, reflected in a higher interest rate or in simply being refused
access to the financial system. In this way, borrowers strive to maintain a good credit
image, thus reducing default rates and interest and increasing the credit granted by
the banking sector.
In sum, the theory shows that a greater degree of information sharing reduces
information asymmetries, moral hazard and default rates, and increases borrower
incentive to honour repayment of their financial commitments. Several papers sup-
port this rationale, suggesting a positive impact of information sharing, for example,
on increasing the volume of credit provided by banking institutions (Brown et al.,
2009; Djankov et al., 2007), lowering the default rate (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002),
decreasing the cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009), increasing corruption-related lend-
ing (Barth, Lin, Lin, & Song, 2009), influencing the level of constraint in financial
access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014), impacting syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009),
influencing tax evasion (Beck, Lin, & Ma, 2014), and finally on how a greater degree
of information sharing might actually contribute to triggering a banking crisis
(B€uy€ukkarabacak & Valev, 2010; Houston et al., 2010).
Additionally, when examining the interaction between the degree of information
sharing and creditor legal protection with the level of bank credit, Djankov et al.
(2007) provide evidence of a positive relationship. However, the authors find that the
effect of a stronger legal system is more important in countries with higher income
whereas information sharing proves relatively more important in poorer countries.
The authors also suggest that a greater degree of information sharing could be a sub-
stitute for a stronger legal system in terms of encouraging a greater level of available
bank credit. Nevertheless, evidence provided by Nana (2014) fails to show any pattern
of substitution among the variables mentioned. Quite the opposite, the results illus-
trate that legal rights, the degree of enforcement and the degree of information shar-
ing each have an independent effect on the ratio of private credit to GDP.
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Empirical evidence suggests that a greater degree of credit information among
lenders increases credit availability. By improving lenders’ knowledge of borrower
characteristics and by enhancing borrower incentives to repay, information sharing
helps to price and reduce the risk of any given loan. To the best of our knowledge,
the influence of the degree of information sharing on banking performance has not
been explored at length in the literature. This leads us to set out and test the follow-
ing hypothesis:
H3: A greater degree of information sharing has a negative impact on banking system
performance.
We also include regulatory quality to reflect the strength of the institutional frame-
work. Empirical cross-country studies have analysed the impact of regulatory and
supervisory policies on banking performance, employing different measures of both
performance and regulations (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004, 2008, Barth, Lin, Ma,
Seade, & Song, 2013; Ben Naceur & Omran, 2011; Delis, Molyneux, & Pasiouras,
2011; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008; Pasiouras, Gaganis, & Zopounidis, 2006, Pasiouras,
Tanna, & Zopounidis, 2009). Despite the above literature, and because bank regula-
tions and supervisory practices comprise a wide range of activities such as capital
regulation, entry regulations, activities restrictions, supervisory power and independ-
ence, external governance and private sector-monitoring (Barth et al., 2013), the rela-
tionship between regulation and bank performance remains an empirical question
(Psillaki & Mamatzakis, 2017).
Related literature (Barth et al., 2013; Mamatzakis, Kalyvas, & Piesse, 2013, 2017)
has shed some light on the possible effect of credit, labour and business market regu-
lations on bank performance. On the one hand, credit market regulations, which
encourage competition and effective governance of financial institutions, exert a posi-
tive effect on banking performance (Barth et al., 2013). Conversely, regulations limit-
ing the abilities of bank management economies of scale or scope would negatively
affect banks’ performance. On the other hand, stringent labour market regulations
may lead to a loss in efficiency and productivity for firms (Scarpetta & Tressel, 2004),
which in turn may trigger a loss in bank cost efficiency. Finally, business market reg-
ulations that discourage market competition and business activity as well as firms’
investment decisions may affect bank performance through spillover effects (Klapper,
Laeven, & Rajan, 2006).
Our measure of regulatory quality reflects government ability to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations to allow and promote private sector
development (Kaufmann, Kray, & Mastruzzi, 2012). Considering the regulatory
framework of the credit and labour market as well as the business sector as key
features in promoting private sector development leads us to formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis:
H4: A higher regulatory quality of banking systems may not significantly impact their
performance.
Our final measure related to institutional framework features is the control of cor-
ruption, which reflects the extent to which public authorities exercise their power for
private benefit. Despite the extensive body of literature that has examined both whether
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and how corruption affects economic development, few studies have explored the role
that corruption plays in the field of financial intermediation and banking. According to
Chen, Nam Jeon, Wang, and Wu (2015), a higher level of corruption may hinder the
increase of credit supply and with it the likelihood of borrower default by raising the
cost of credit. On the other hand, firms with higher productivity and efficiency can
offer higher bribes and, thus, may be more likely to receive more loans. The empirical
evidence on the effect of corruption on financial performance is mixed. On the one
hand, Dinc (2005) reports that state-owned banks significantly increase their lending in
election years, suggesting that politicians may be using their power to influence bank
credit for their own benefit. Similarly, Khwaja and Mian (2005) provide evidence that
politically connected firms are able to obtain more loans from banks but end up with a
higher default rate. Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006) report that polit-
ically connected firms can obtain better access to long-term bank loans and need less
collateral. On the other hand, Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2008) and Weill (2011)
show that the lending growth rate diminishes amid an environment with more severe
corruption. In a similar vein, Park (2012) shows that the rate of non-performing loans
increases in countries that face higher corruption levels. More recently, Chen et al.
(2015) find that higher levels of corruption increase banks’ risk-taking. The authors
also find evidence that the impact of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking behaviour
is more pronounced when there is greater and more severe corruption. To the best of
our knowledge, the influence of corruption on banking performance has not been
explored directly by previous studies.
H5a: An institutional environment with a higher level and severity of corruption
negatively affects banking system performance.
H5b: An institutional environment with a higher level and severity of corruption
positively affects banking system performance.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Our data set comprises country-level information from several sources. First, infor-
mation related to the characteristics of each country’s financial system was obtained
from the latest revised version of the Financial Development and Structure Dataset
(Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. 2018).6 Second, the macroeconomic statistics for each country
were obtained from the information available in World Development Indicators from
the World Bank. Third, information on the legal and institutional environment was
obtained from both Doing Business and the Worldwide Governance Indicator.
Our final dataset is a panel data comprising 342 observations from 52 countries
for the period 2005–2014, of which 31 countries belong to emerging economies and
the remaining 21 countries to advanced economies.7 Data are limited to 2014 because
of methodological changes in certain key variables provided by Doing Business.
Based on prior literature, we consider banking industry return on assets (ROA) as
the dependent variable. The inclusion of ROA as a measure of performance is justi-
fied as this measure is a proxy for banks’ ability to manage their assets in such a way
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as to generate profits (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 2008; Garcıa-Meca, Garcıa-
Sanchez, & Martınez-Ferrero, 2015, Liang, Xu, & Jiraporn, 2013; Goddard, McKillop,
& Wilson, 2008). One advantage of ROA over other measures of performance, such
as Net Interest Margin (NIM), is the fact that ROA considers incomes from activities
other than the core banking business, i.e., it assumes that banks engage in activities
such as securitisation, brokerage, insurance, and so on. In other words, two banks
may exhibit different NIM because of cross-subsidisation of activities, which would
not reflect better or worse performance.
As control variables, we have incorporated a collection of variables that are spe-
cific to the banking industry and the macroeconomic environment. As regards the
first group of variables, we incorporate the variable ‘BankConc’ as a proxy for the
degree of competition, which represents the degree of concentration in the bank-
ing industry. To control for economies’ financial structures and for their level of
financial development, we incorporate both the capitalisation of the stock market
over GDP (MarketCap) and the amount of private credit through bank deposits
over GDP (PrivateCredit). In both indicators, a higher value would give us infor-
mation pointing to a market that is more oriented towards the stock market or the
banking industry (Beck & Demirg€uc¸-Kunt, 2009). As regards the level of banking
sector development, some studies suggest a negative impact on banking perform-
ance, arguing that a larger banking sector would increase the competitive environ-
ment, which would eventually drive the performance of banks downward.
However, and with regard to stock market development, there is no consensus vis-
a-vis its effect on the profitability of the banking industry in the sense that greater
stock market growth might increase competition within the banking industry or
improve its performance at certain stages of economic development across coun-
tries (Demirg€uc¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Demirg€uc¸-Kunt & Levine, 2004; Ben
Naceur & Omran, 2011).
Considering the importance of savings deposits for banking institutions, we
incorporate a proxy variable of the demand for deposits (BankDeposit), which
reflects business opportunities and represents a stable source of financing for
banks. Moreover, taking account of the fact that deposit insurances are offered
in several countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability,
and because deposits are considered a source of agency problems (Berger, 1995),
we find it interesting to explore their possible effect on banking system
performance.
In order to capture the instability or insolvency risk of the banking industry, we
include the variable ‘Z-Score’, which indicates the number of standard deviations a
banking industry’s rate of return (ROA) must drop below its expected value before
the banking system enters insolvency. In other words, if ROA follows a normal distri-
bution, the Z-score represents the inverse of the probability of insolvency. A higher
Z-score thus indicates a more stable banking industry (Beck et al., 2009). Finally, we
incorporate stock market volatility which, according to Albertazzi and Gambacorta
(2009), captures the evolution in the level of uncertainty and general risk in a specific
market (MarketVol).
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In relation to the group of macroeconomic variables frequently cited in the bank-
ing literature that might impact banking system performance (Athanasoglou et al.,
2008; Perry, 1992), we include the annual rate of both inflation (Inflation), and
growth of GDP (GGDP). As regards variables related to the legal and institutional
framework, the central objective of our study, we incorporate the following set of var-
iables: the index of the strength of legal rights (LegalRights) measures the degree to
which a country protects borrowers and lenders in order to facilitate credit activity.
Constructing this variable considers eight factors related to legal rights in terms of
collateral laws and two aspects associated with bankruptcy laws. The first eight factors
bear a close relationship with the rights of the borrower and only the last two factors
refer to the rights of the bank. A value of 1 is assigned to each of them when they
are present in the laws of each country, and zero when they are not. The advantage
of this variable, compared to that used in prior studies, is that it considers the legal
protection of both lender and borrower, and does not focus solely on the legal pro-
tection of the creditor. This is critical in relation to the banking industry, as little
legal protection for the borrower could inhibit access to credit (Nana, 2014).
Additionally, and in order to measure the degree of efficiency of the judicial sys-
tems in resolving a legal dispute in a specific country, we incorporate the ‘RuleofLaw’
variable as a proxy variable for the degree of enforcement of laws and/or contracts.
This variable captures agents’ perceptions of the extent to which a society’s rules are
adhered to, and particularly the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and
the courts, among other aspects. In other words, this variable reflects the risk of con-
tracts being ignored and the risk of expropriation of private property. At this point, it
is important to point out that, as a proxy variable for legal enforcement, previous
studies often employ the index proposed by La Porta et al. (2006), which basically
measures the effectiveness of minority shareholder rights.8
In addition, and in relation to the institutional environment, we incorporate the
proxy variables ‘CreditRegistry’ and ‘CreditBureau’, which reflect the number of indi-
viduals or companies registered in a public (CreditRegistry) and private (Credit
Bureau) agency in relation to their credit information (unpaid debts, outstanding
credit, and so on) both current and over the last five years.
Consequently, these variables reflect the effect of several regulations adopted by
countries in order to facilitate the accessibility and quality of the credit information
available in a certain banking industry, and whose aim is to support decision-making
when granting credit. Prior studies have generally employed a dummy variable equal
to 1 for the existence of either a public or private credit registry, and zero in its
absence, ignoring the coverage of the adult population on whom credit information
registers are held by either private or public agencies.
Finally, we incorporate two further variables related to the institutional framework.
‘RegulQuality’ measures the perception of a government’s ability to devise and imple-
ment sound policies and regulations to encourage private sector development.
Similarly, and as a proxy variable of the level of corruption present in a certain econ-
omy, we include the ‘ControlCorrupt’ variable, which reflects perceptions concerning
to what extent public power is exercised for private benefit.9 All of the variables men-
tioned are summed up in Table 1.
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Table 1. Definition of variables.
Abbreviation Variable Definition
Dependent variable:
ROA Return on Assets Average Return on Assets (Net Income/Total Assets).
Source: Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. (2013)
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic and industry-specific characteristics:
GGDP GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic product.
Source: World Development Indicators
Inflation Inflation rate Current period inflation rate. Source: World
Development Indicators
BankConc Bank Concentration Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all
commercial banks. Source: Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. (2013).
MarketCap Stock Market Capitalisation Value of listed shares to GDP. Source: Demirg€uc¸-Kunt
et al. (2013)
Z-Score Bank z-score Z-score is estimated as (ROAþ equity/assets)/sd(ROA);
sd(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. Source:
Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. (2013).
BankDeposit Bank Deposits to GDP Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks
as a share of GDP Source: Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. (2013)
PrivateCredit Private Credit to GDP Private credit by deposit money banks as a share of GDP.
Source: Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al. (2013
MarketVol. Stock Market Volatility Standard deviation of a country stock index divided by
average return. Source: Datastream, Authors’ own
calculation
Legal and Institutional Variables
Legal:
LegalRights Strength of Legal Rights Index It measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy
laws protect the rights of both borrowers and lenders in
order to facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to
10, with higher scores indicating that these laws are
better designed to expand access to credit. Source:
http://www.doingbusiness.com.
RuleofLaw Rule of Law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. Source: http// www.
govindicators.org
Institutional:
CreditRegistry Public Credit Registry Coverage Number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit
registry with current information on repayment history,
unpaid debts, or outstanding credit. The number is
expressed as a percentage of the adult population.
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.com.
http://www.doingbusiness.com.
CreditBureau Private Credit Bureau Coverage Number of individuals or firms listed by a private credit
bureau with current information on repayment history,
unpaid debts, or outstanding credit. The number is
expressed as a percentage of the adult population.
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.com.
http://www.doingbusiness.com.
RegulQuality Regulatory Quality Reflects the perception of government ability to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development. Source:
http//www.govindicators.org
ControlCorrup Control of Corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and
major forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the
state by elites and private interests. Source: http// www.
govindicators.org
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3.2. Methodology
To analyse the potential effect of variables related to the legal and institutional frame-
work on banking system performance, we propose equation (1), which takes the fol-
lowing form:






dkInstitutionali, t þ xlControli, t þ Ci þ yt þ ei, t
where ROAit represents the return on assets of the country’s banking system ‘i’ in
year ‘t’, LEGALit represents the vector of the legal environment determinants
(LegalRights and RuleofLaw); Institutionalit is the vector of the institutional determi-
nants (CreditRegistry, CreditBureau, RegulQuality and ControlCorrup); Controlit rep-
resents the vector of the control variables. In addition, a set of fixed effects is
included at different aggregation levels to control for unobservable time-invariant and
time-variant fixed effects. In particular, fixed effects are included at the country level ðciÞ
and year level ðytÞ: Finally eit measures the stochastic error.
The definitions of all the variables are provided in Table 1. Banking performance
is defined at a country’s banking system level, treating each banking system in terms
of a single agent (Hawtrey & Liang, 2008). Consequently, equation (1) is estimated
employing two-way fixed effects OLS data panel regressions. We have selected this
estimation method since panel data allow us to control for both country-fixed effects
and time-fixed effects within the same model. That is, panel data regressions control
by unobservable heterogeneity and give us more reliable estimations than other OLS
estimation procedures (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 1995).
Additionally, we also use a dynamic GMM panel estimator to check the robustness
of our results. Specifically, use of the GMM system is justifiable because past shocks
to the dependent variable may directly affect the contemporaneous explanatory vari-
able in the form of a lagged dependent variable. The appropriateness of the set of
instruments is formally evaluated by the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions
and the Arellano-Bond tests for error autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive analysis
Panel A of Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation as well as maximum and
minimum values used in our analysis. Panel B in Table 2 presents the mean (standard
deviation) of the segmented variables in accordance with the upper and lower third
of ROA. Additionally, panel B of Table 2 shows the ‘t’ statistics for the differences in
means in order to pinpoint the existence of significant differences in each of the vari-
ables employed in the analysis.
Panel B of Table 2 shows how banking systems with the highest profits on their
assets tend to display both higher rates of economic growth (GGDP) and higher lev-
els of inflation (Inflation). As regards the variables of the industry itself, we see how
banking systems exhibiting poorer performance tend to evidence higher rates of stock
market capitalisation over GDP (MarketCap), higher rates of private credit provided
by the banking sector in relation to GDP (PrivateCredit) and a greater concentration
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in the banking industry (BankConc). As for other features, greater banking system
stability (Z-Score) is associated with higher rates of return on assets in the banking
industry, and lower stock market volatility (MarketVol) is associated with lower rates
of return on assets in the banking industry.
As regards legal environment features, we observe that banking systems with lower
banking performance (ROA) show a higher degree of legal protection (LegalRights)
and a higher degree of enforcement (RuleofLaw).
Institutional environment features are presented in Panel B of Table 2. On average,
the number of individuals or companies registered both in a private bureau
(CreditBureau) or a public registry (CreditRegistry) is much higher for banking sys-
tems that tend to evidence superior banking performance. We also see how banking
systems that perform better exhibit lower regulatory quality and control of corrup-
tion, on average. Finally, in order to observe the times series variation in the indica-
tors, in Table 3 we report means and standard deviations per year.
Table 2. Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values for the
total sample. Panel B reports the mean (standard deviation) and the test of difference of means for
each of the variables used in the segmented analysis for the upper and lower thirds of banking per-
formance.  indicates the 1% significance level;  5% significance level; 10% significance level.
Panel A: Description of total sample
Variables Obs Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum
ROA 342 0.782 1.167 8.522 4.241
BankConc 342 63.61 18.23 28.80 100
MarketCap 342 57.21 42.98 1.164 263.7
Z-score 342 12.15 6.27 0.016 29.19
GGDP 342 2.32 3.56 14.72 11.11
Inflation 342 3.57 3.54 4.47 28.18
BankDeposit 342 67.90 35.43 15.12 217.5
MarketVol 342 0.065 0.181 0.334 0.618
PrivateCredit 342 77.11 40.20 12.96 174.03
LegalRights 342 6.05 2.13 2 10
RuleofLaw 342 0.883 0.864 1.689 2.029
Credit Registry 342 10.74 20.22 0 100
Credit Bureau 342 50.23 37.05 0 100
RegulQuality 342 0.944 0.710 1.623 1.914
ControlCorrup 342 0.850 0.949 1.268 2.464
Total Obs.
Panel B: Descriptors for the upper and lower thirds of return on assets
ROA Difference of means
Upper third Lower third Upper third vs. lower third (Statistic t)
GGDP 1.64(0.11) 0.26(0.08) 10.47
Inflation 2.26(0.42) 0.74(0.19) 3.27
MarketCap 14.56(1.33) 21.33(1.70) 3.12
PrivateCredit 14.53(1.09) 35.08(2.19) 8.37
BankConc 19.73(1.15) 22.64(1.34) 1.64
BankDeposit 15.39(32.26) 28.32(1.89) 5.58
Z-Score 4.73(0.34) 3.85(0.26) 2.05
MarketVol 0.04(0.01) 0.02(0.003) 3.92
LegalRights 1.78(.12) 2.08(0.14) 1.61
RuleofLaw 0.01(0.023) 0.38(0.026) 10.34
CreditRegistry 5.52(0.523) 4.17(15.47) 1.70
CreditBureau 19.61(1.25) 16.68(1.28) 1.63
RegulQuality 0.14(0.022) 0.37(0.024) 6.96
ControlCorrup 0.03(0.022) 0.38(0.028) 9.52
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4.2. Explanatory analysis
The estimations for checking our proposed hypotheses are displayed in Table 5,
which shows the results for the different estimations of equation (1), considering the
individual and simultaneous effects of the variables related to the legal and institu-
tional environment separately in each estimation (columns 1 to 9). In this step, we
analyse the potential effect of the proxy variables related to the legal environment
(LegalRights and RuleofLaw) and only two variables concerning the institutional
environment, specifically the proxy variables of information sharing (CreditRegistry
and CreditBureau). In this way, we examine the impact of the control variables linked
to both the macroeconomic environment and the banking industry, and especially the
effect of the legal and institutional environment variables with respect to our per-
formance variable measured as the return on assets (ROA).
The results presented in Table 4 show a relationship that is both positive and stat-
istically significant between economic growth (GGDP) and banking system perform-
ance (ROA) in all of the estimations carried out, and which concurs with results
reported by previous studies in the sense that greater economic growth favours the
demand for credit, reduces the provisions for credit losses and favours income for
activities other than the core banking business. In other words, it favours income
from diversification that includes activities such as trading and securitisation, broker-
age commissions, advisory fees and so on (Goddard, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2004,
among others). Likewise, the inflation rate has a positive and statistically significant
relation with banking sector performance. This result supports the argument that
banks are capable of anticipating inflationary expectations and, therefore, of adjusting
their income before they are hit. Consequently, they are able to improve their per-
formance (Demirg€uc¸-Kunt et al., 2004; Perry, 1992).
In relation to the control variables of the banking industry itself, and with regard to
the degree of competition (BankConc), we see a negative and statistically significant
effect in all the estimations presented in Table 4. This result supports the arguments
initially proposed by Berger (1995) and supported by several subsequent papers. Once
the quality of the legal and institutional environment has been accounted for, a higher
degree of banking concentration negatively affects banking institution performance.
Our results support the argument that superior operational efficiency will mean that
banks pass their lower costs on to their customers through lower loan interest rates
and higher deposit interest rates, which will eventually have a negative effect on the
net interest margin and, consequently, on banking sector performance.
As regards the influence of banking industry stability on its performance, Table 4
shows a positive and statistically significant effect. These results reveal the importance
of a stable and solid banking industry, which reflects both the quality of the regula-
tory framework and the role of the supervisory authorities. Less risk of banking insti-
tution insolvency, translated into a higher Z-Score, would allow them access to lower
financing costs, which would entail a higher net interest margin and, consequently, a
higher return on assets.
Likewise, one important aspect that should also be explored is the possible effect of
the degree of capital market uncertainty, and indeed of the economy as a whole, on
banking industry performance. In light of the above, the ‘MarketVol’ variable, which
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captures local stock market volatility, presents a positive and statistically significant
relationship on ROA, which might be explained by a reduction in the financing costs
resulting from greater demand for deposits due to greater stock market uncertainty.
However, as can be seen in Table 4, the variables associated with each country’s
financial development (PrivateCredit and MarketCap) are not statistically significant
when it comes to explaining their effect on banking industry performance.
Nevertheless, and in relation to the main variables in our study, we see that when
incorporating the degree of legal protection (LegalRights) separately, we find a posi-
tive and statistically significant effect on ROA in column (1) and column (2). This
effect is consistent with our hypothesis H1a in the sense that a greater degree of legal
protection both for the borrower and the lender would permit better collateral. In
Table 4. Legal Determinants of Banking Performance. This table reports the regression results of
equation (1) regarding the determinants of banking performance. The dependent variable is the
ROA in all columns. LegalRights is the strength of the legal rights index and RuleofLaw is the rule
of law indicator. Both variables reflect the legal environment. CreditRegistry is the public credit
registry coverage and CreditBureau is the private credit bureau coverage. Both variables reflect
the institutional environment. The control variable BankConc is bank concentration, MarketCap is
the stock market capitalisation, Z-Score is the bank z-score, GGDP is the annual GDP growth rate,
INFLATION is the annual inflation rate, BankDeposit is the ratio of bank deposits to GDP,
PrivateCredit is the ratio of private credit to GDP and MarketVol is stock market volatility. Detailed
definitions for each variable can be found in Section 3. We estimate all regressions by using two-
way fixed effects OLS data panel regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  indicates
the 1% significance level;  5% significance level; 10% significance level.
Dependent Variable: Industry ROA
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LegalRights 0.205 0.194 0.171 0.170
(0.079) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
Ruleoflaw 1.090 1.041 0.967 1.021
(0.487) (0.327) (0.341) (0.316)
CreditBureau 0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
CreditRegistry 0.013 0.008 0.010
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
BankConc 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MarketCap 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Z-Score 0.173 0.175 0.174 0.173 0.174 0.175
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
GGDP 0.132 0.133 0.131 0.134 0.134 0.132
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037)
Inflation 0.097 0.097 0.093 0.101 0.099 0.090
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028)
BankDeposit 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
MarketVol 0.673 0.624 0.696 0.588 0.605 0.717
(0.303) (0.308) (0.312) (0.293) (0.307) (0.327)
PrivateCredit 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342
R-squared 0.165 0.451 0.170 0.455 0.4591 0.163 0.445 0.164 0.447 0.462
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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other words, it would drive repayment of debt, thereby reducing the amount of
unpaid debts and increasing the number of loans granted. In addition, due to the
negative consequences for the company administration of being faced with financial
constraints, greater legal protection may lead creditors to force a change in the
administration during company reorganisation such that borrowers may be less will-
ing to take risks (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011).
In order to complement the analysis of the effect of the legal environment on
banking system performance, we include the proxy variable for the degree and quality
of contract enforcement (RuleofLaw). The results in Table 4, columns (3) and (4),
show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of enforce-
ment and bank sector performance, thus supporting our hypothesis H2a.
However, when the degree of legal protection is included with the degree of
enforcement (Column 5) in the model, the effect of ‘RuleofLaw’ drops (0.967) com-
pared to the results displayed in column (4), although not in statistical significance.
Compared to column (2), the effect of ‘LegalRights’ also drops (0.171), although not in
statistical significance. This would not, however, suggest a substitution pattern between
the degree of law enforcement and the degree of legal protection. Indeed, both a
greater degree of legal protection for borrower and lender and a higher degree of legal
enforcement are required to facilitate the obtaining and granting of credit.
As regards our two proxy variables of information sharing, results in Table 4 (col-
umns (6) to (9)) fail to provide evidence of a significant effect on banking industry
performance. In other words, a higher degree of credit information held by either a
public registry or a private bureau does not affect banking system performance. Thus,
our results do not support our hypothesis H3.
Along the same lines, when the influence of the degree of legal protection, the degree
of law enforcement and the degree of information sharing, measured by CreditRegistry,
are included simultaneously in the same regression, column (10) displays the same
results as in previous columns. In conclusion, a legal environment with a higher degree
of legal protection for both borrowers and lenders, in addition to a higher degree of
enforcement of laws and contracts, positively affects banking system performance.
It is important to point out that the findings revealed by Table 4 regarding the vari-
ables linked to the legal and institutional environment are related to the banking sys-
tem performance in three ways. First, a greater degree of legal protection for borrower
and lender that promotes the obtaining and granting of credit has a positive effect on
banking sector performance. Second, a better enforcement system, i.e., less risk of con-
tracts going unfulfilled and/or less risk of private property expropriation, positively
affects banking system performance. Finally, greater coverage of individuals and firms
regarding their credit information does not affect banking industry performance.
At this point, it is worth including in the analysis the potential effects of the two
remaining proxy variables related to the institutional environment and which shape
the institutional framework where banking institutions carry out their operations and
relationships with customers, regulatory authorities and supervisory entities, among
other agents. In this sense, policies and regulations that aim to promote private sector
development (RegulQuality) and control corruption (ControlCorrup) are dimensions
that might impact banking system performance.
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In this sense, Table 5 displays the results for the different estimations carried out by
equation (1), including separately in each estimation the individual (columns 1 and 3)
and simultaneous (columns 2 and 4) effects of the aforementioned variables
(‘RegulQuality’ and ‘ControlCorrup’) as well as legal protection for lender and borrower.
First, and in line with the results in Table 5, columns (1) and (2) show a positive
and statistically significant effect of regulatory quality on banking industry perform-
ance. However, columns (3) and (4) fail to provide any evidence of a statistically sig-
nificant effect of control of corruption on ROA. These results are not consistent with
our hypotheses H4, nor with H5a or indeed H5b.
Second, these estimations continue to evidence a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect of the strength of legal rights on banking industry performance.
Finally, as regards the banking industry and macroeconomic environment variables,
results in Table 5 remain similar to those reported in the initial estimations in Table 4.10
Table 5. Legal determinants of banking performance. This table reports the regression results of
equation (1) regarding the determinants of banking performance. The dependent variable is the
ROA in all columns. LegalRights is the strength of the legal rights index and RuleofLaw is the rule
of law indicator. Both variables reflect the legal environment. RegulQuality is the regulatory qual-
ity indicator and ControlCorrup is the control of corruption indicator. Both variables are two alter-
native measures for the institutional environment. The control variable BankConc is bank
concentration, MarketCap is stock market capitalisation, Z-Score is the bank z-score, GGDP is the
annual GDP growth rate, INFLATION is the annual inflation rate, BankDeposit is the ratio of bank
deposits to GDP, PrivateCredit is the ratio of private credit to GDP and MarketVol is stock market
volatility. Detailed definitions for each variable can be found in Section 3. We estimate all regres-
sions by using two-way fixed effects OLS data panel regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.  indicates the 1% significance level;  5% significance level; 10% significance level.
Dependent Variable: Industry ROA







BankConc 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
MarketCap 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Z-Score 0.173 0.173 0.169 0.170
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034)
GGDP 0.124 0.122 0.130 0.129
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Inflation 0.091 0.087 0.102 0.098
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
BankDeposit 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MarketVol 0.584 0.661 0.576 0.658
(0.323) (0.328) (0.296) (0.307)
PrivateCredit 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 342 342 342 342
R-squared 0.470 0.474 0.448 0.453
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
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4.3. Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we carried out the same estimations of Equation (1) shown in
Table 4 using a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (System GMM) panel esti-
mator. The results, reported in Table 6, are consistent with the results shown in the
previous section.
Table 6. Legal determinants of banking performance – GMM. This table reports the regression
results of equation (1) regarding the determinants of banking performance. The dependent vari-
able is the ROA in all columns. LegalRights is the strength of legal rights index and RuleofLaw is
the rule of law indicator. Both variables reflect the legal environment. RegulQuality is the regula-
tory quality indicator and ControlCorrup is the control of corruption indicator. Both variables are
two alternative measures for the institutional environment. The control variable BankConc is bank
concentration, MarketCap is stock market capitalisation, Z-Score is the bank z-score, GGDP is the
annual GDP growth rate, INFLATION is the annual inflation rate, BankDeposit is the ratio of bank
deposits to GDP, PrivateCredit is the ratio of private credit to GDP and MarketVol is stock market
volatility. Detailed definitions for each variable can be found in Section 3. We estimate all regres-
sions by using the generalised method of moments. Auto(2) is the test of second-order serial
autocorrelation of the residuals. The Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymp-
totically distributed as v^2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments
and the error term. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  indicates the 1% significance level; 5% significance level; 10% significance level.
Dependent Variable: Industry ROA
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged ROA 0.195 0.179 0.193 0.436









BankConc 0.040 0.047 0.015 0.004
(0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.033)
MarketCap 0.002 0.005 0.019 0.017
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013)
Z-Score 0.049 0.013 0.137 0.122
(0.039) (0.030) (0.027) (0.142)
GGDP 0.064 0.041 0.023 0.003
(0.027) (0.022) (0.012) (0.037)
Inflation 0.055 0.022 0.121 0.015
(0.046) (0.018) (0.021) (0.168)
BankDeposit 0.004 0.014 0.011 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.071)
MarketVol 0.011 0.585 0.811 1.437
(0.282) (0.173) (0.196) (0.334)
PrivateCredit 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.005
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.030)
Observations 305 305 305 305
Year FE YES YES YES YES
F-Test 16.45 15.46 16.82 30.25
Auto(2) 0.156 0.157 0.189 0.175
Hansen p-value 0.849 0.345 0.872 0.876
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 19
5. Conclusions
We began this study by posing the question ‘Do legal and institutional environments
impact banking system performance?’ First, our results show how important it is to
have a legal framework that strengthens legal protection for both creditors and bor-
rowers alike. A greater degree of legal protection allows banking systems to improve
the quality of the collaterals, improve debt recovery rates in the event of borrower
default and even force the payment of debt, which positively affects banking sector
performance. Furthermore, more legal protection can impose a greater degree of dis-
cipline on the borrower, i.e., the administration of the company, which is then
reflected in less willingness to take risks when faced with the possibility of a change
of administration in the event of default.
Additionally, a legal framework that favours legal protection of both creditors and
borrowers must also provide the necessary conditions to facilitate the enforcement of
laws and/or contracts. Along these lines, our results show that a greater degree of
enforcement of contracts and/or laws positively affects banking system performance.
Furthermore, our results do not suggest a substitution pattern between the degree of
legal protection and the degree of law enforcement: rather, both aspects are necessary
to facilitate the obtaining and granting of credit.
Our results also suggest that an institutional framework which promotes the exist-
ence of public and private entities for registering and making credit information
available, for both companies and individuals, would not have a positive effect on
banking industry performance. In addition, and with regard to the efficiency of regu-
latory systems, it is regulatory quality and not the control of corruption which
presents a statistically significant effect on banking sector performance, which does
not support our hypotheses.
Finally, the bodies responsible for regulating and supervising the banking sector must
focus their interest as much on promoting a set of good corporate governance practices
in banking institutions as on providing an adequate legal and institutional framework in
order to endow the banking system with stability and confidence, which is critical to the
smooth running of the economy as a whole. Regulators and supervisors have to improve
measures and guidance to control risk governance at banks. These include strengthening
existing regulation, raising supervisory expectations for the risk management function,
engaging more often with the board and management, and assessing the accuracy and
usefulness of the information provided to the board. Supervisors should also have tools
at their disposal to address governance improvement needs and governance failures.
They should have mechanisms available for improvement and remedial action, and
should ensure accountability for a bank’s corporate governance. Among the tools, men-
tion can be made of the ability to force changes in the bank’s policies and practices, the
composition of the board of directors or senior management, or other corrective actions
(Basel Committee & Banking Supervision, 2015).
Certain limitations to our research must also be considered. First, comparable data
are only available up to 2014, which prevents us from making more public policy rec-
ommendations. Moreover, we had no variables available to proxy legal protection at
the banking level. In this sense, a rational extension of this paper would be to include
an indicator for legal protection at the banking level. The quality of banking
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corporate governance might also be included as a variable. Finally, the possibility of
including a greater number of countries in an effort to secure more general conclu-
sions should also be considered.
Notes
1. Source: http://www.doingbusiness.com.
2. Credit reference agencies or information sharing offices are institutions established to
gather and collect information related to the financial obligations of commercial and
individual borrowers towards financial institutions. Before 2008, information sharing
offices were predominately established in OECD countries. After the 2008 financial crisis,
establishing information sharing offices became a more important financial policy issue
in developing countries (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017).
3. Over the period from 2005 to 2016, 330 reforms took place in areas related to obtaining
credit, 157 reforms related to the degree of law enforcement and/or contracts, 159
reforms related to improving insolvency, and 147 reforms aimed at strengthening the
legal protection of minority investors,
4. In section 3, we discuss the advantages offered by these indicators compared to those
employed in previous studies.
5. In this section, the degree of information sharing is used interchangeably with public
credit registries and private credit bureaus.
6. The updated July 2018 version contains data spanning 1960 to 2016. Information for
2017 is reflected when available. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/
gfdr/data/financial-structure-database
7. Appendix 1 displays the list of countries that make up our sample and a summary of the main
variables related to the financial system as well as the legal and institutional environment.
8. See also Kaufmann et al., (2012) as an interesting source that describes and discusses
governance indicators.
9. The variables that measure the legal and institutional arrangements change according to
the country’s legal orientation (e.g., French civil law and common law). The value of the
variable will be directly related to the type of legal orientation.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Summary of main indicators by country. All country-level variables are averages for





















Argentina Ems 2.37 46.03 11.45 5 33.04 97.56 0.61 0.73 0.398
Australia Aes 1.07 68.21 115.9 9.2 0 99.54 1.77 1.75 1.97
Austria Aes 0.54 72.29 92.71 6 1.41 44.19 1.87 1.53 1.68
Belgium Aes 0.15 73.82 59.36 5 65.12 0 1.38 1.29 1.49
Bulgaria Ems 1.46 44.51 56.05 9 27.03 3.78 0.081 0.62 0.16
Brazil Ems 1.52 55.39 46.11 3 25.55 54.75 0.18 0.05 0.06
Canada Aes 0.63 79.98 122.7 7 0 100 1.77 1.59 1.96
Switzerland Aes 0.08 89.65 155.9 8 0 24.3 1.82 1.61 2.09
Chile Ems 1.51 50.43 67.12 4.6 31.78 22.34 1.33 1.47 1.47
China Ems 1.02 49.27 117.19 4.3 27.3 0 0.45 0.22 0.44
Colombia Ems 1.84 67.58 31.76 5 0 52.35 0.39 .26 0.28
Costa Rica Ems 1.43 58.55 40.42 3 12.5 44.02 0.49 0.47 0.59
Czech Republic Ems 1.52 65.19 42.52 6.5 4.13 59.25 0.94 4.13 59.25
Germany Aes 0.10 74.83 91.58 7.4 0.75 96.09 1.70 1.56 1.79
Denmark Aes 0.35 81.67 182.2 8.8 0 7.56 1.95 1.78 2.34
Dominican
Republic
Ems 1.97 70.23 20.39 3 29.37 51.66 0.60 0.15 0.78
Ecuador Ems 1.61 53.47 21.91 2 25.44 40.5 1.14 1.12 0.72
Spain Aes 0.38 60.39 154.8 6 47.69 9.53 1.12 1.10 1.07
Estonia Ems 0.88 95.65 77.72 6.25 0 19.57 1.14 1.37 1.02
Finland Aes 0.62 95.80 79.56 8 0 15.52 1.95 1.72 2.29
France Aes 0.22 62.30 90.24 4.5 28.51 0 1.46 1.21 1.42
United Kingdom Aes 0.26 55.48 158.9 10 0 94.08 1.72 1.74 1.75
Greece Aes 0.84 65.92 96.89 4 0 50.32 0.65 0.71 0.07
Guatemala Ems 1.61 65.02 27.08 6.3 15.11 11.77 1.04 0.21 0.67
Hong Kong SAR,
China
Ems 1.31 63.80 172.5 10 0 79.26 1.62 1.96 1.76
Hungary Ems 0.36 50.27 54.80 7 0 15.69 0.78 1.04 0.44
India Ems 0.99 31.23 44.35 7.5 0 9.91 0.02 0.37 0.43
Ireland Aes 0.64 69.32 131.4 9 0 100 1.73 1.69 1.64
Italy Aes 0.17 52.56 84.95 3 14.82 78.92 0.43 0.86 0.21
Japan Aes 0.24 42.31 99.15 6.8 0 77.97 1.35 1.13 1.45
Korea, Rep. Ems 0.58 63.54 97.46 6 0 92.36 0.98 0.91 0.53
Mexico Ems 1.71 55.76 15.52 5.3 0 73.55 0.51 0.34 0.38
Netherlands Aes 0.32 84.16 115.4 4.9 0 79.62 1.82 1.74 2.08
Norway Aes 0.82 93.94 97.26 6 0 100 1.94 1.48 2.10
New Zealand Aes 1.08 71.70 136.8 10 0 98.93 1.86 1.74 2.32
Panama Ems 1.36 46.63 72.08 5 0 50.46 0.09 0.37 0.34
Peru Ems 2.32 75.72 27.95 6.2 26.01 48.83 0.59 0.38 0.34
Poland Ems 1.29 38.44 44.42 8.5 0 67.53 0.63 0.92 0.53
Portugal Aes 0.35 84.99 143.9 3 77.41 14.97 1.06 0.93 1.03
Paraguay Ems 2.69 52.87 32.14 3 15.18 48.43 0.83 0.42 0.93
Romania Ems 0.75 56.87 30.93 8.7 9.05 29.78 0.07 0.54 0.16
Russian Federation Ems 1.36 29.58 39.11 5 0 30.42 0.82 0.36 0.98
El Salvador Ems 1.33 65.01 40.74 5 23.70 70.82 0.66 0.19 0.37
Slovak Republic Ems 0.88 65.99 40.44 8 1.51 38.52 0.54 1.05 0.29
Slovenia Ems 0.16 54.61 66.51 4.4 2.93 46.06 0.99 0.72 0.89
Sweden Aes 0.56 95.92 115.0 7.25 0 99.75 1.91 1.66 2.22
Turkey Ems 2.14 44.18 35.27 4 14.63 41.88 0.07 0.33 0.05
Uruguay Ems 1.05 64.71 23.57 4 38.69 94.60 0.62 0.42 1.27
United States Aes 0.83 34.38 53.29 9 0 100 1.60 1.44 1.37
Venezuela, RB Ems 2.88 40.85 18.44 2 0 10.46 1.67 1.54 1.22
Croatia Ems 0.92 56.23 63.55 6.4 0 60.24 0.17 0.49 0.08
Egypt, Arab Rep. Ems 0.93 58.26 34.52 3 2.61 7.29 0.31 0.39 0.66
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